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The Government's Right to Appeal in Criminal
Cases-A Procedural Question
The use of the double jeopardy clause to bar appeal by the government in
criminal cases has recently come under close scrutiny by the United States
Supreme Court. An ostensible shift in rationale by the Court concerning
the application of the double jeopardy clause is examined, using a a
background, cases which have reached the Court in varying procedural
stages. The current shift in the rationale away from a concern for multiple
trials and toward trial court determinations of culpability before the
double jeopardy comes into play, may place too great an emphasis on
when a procedural "acquittal" is entered. Thus, the author concludes, the
once expansive protection provided by the double jeopardy clause may be
limited by procedural concerns.
It has long been a rule of law that the federal government may
not take appeal in a criminal case without express statutory au-
thority.' Early statutory authority, however, provided the govern-
ment with little help. In United States v. Sanges,2 the Court held
that general provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1891,3 were not suf-
ficiently explicit to overcome the common-law rule that "the State
could not sue out a writ of error in a criminal case unless the leg-
islature had expressly granted it that right."4 In 1907, Congress
passed the first Criminal Appeals Act providing for appeals by the
government in limited circumstances. 5
1. In United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1892), the Supreme Court
sets forth the rule that the government may not take appeal in a criminal case
without statutory authority.
But whatever may have been, or may be, the law of England ... it is
settled by an overwhelming weight of American authority, that the State
has no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the de-
fendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express
statutes....
Id. at 312.
2. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
3. The Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827, 828 (1891), provided, in
part, as follows "That appeals or writs of error may be taken . . .direct to the
Supreme Court in the following cases: ... From the final sentences and decrees in
prize causes. In cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime."
4. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 322-23 (1892) (quoting United States
v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1975)).
5. The Criminal Appeals Act, Pub. L. No. 223, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907), provided, in
part, as follows:
That a writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the United States
... in the following instances, to wit:
Though the Act was amended several times to increase the abil-
ity of the government to appeal in criminal cases, the Act had a
very limited effect. 6 The Court continued to construe the Act in a
technical manner in accordance with the common-law meaning of
the terms employed and thus limited the ability of the govern-,
ment to appeal. 7 Finally, after years of dealing with the 1907 Act
and its amendments, the Court concluded that the Act was "a fail-
ure... a most unruly child that had not improved with age."8
In 1971, Congress adopted a Criminal Appeals Act intending to
broaden the government's right to appeal in criminal cases.9 The
legislative history of this Act reveals that Congress intended to
permit the government to appeal any decision or order terminat-
ing a prosecution except where appeal would violate the double
jeopardy provision of the United States Constitution.1 0 Congress
directed that all statutory barriers to government appeals be re-
moved and that only the Constitution should limit the govern-
ment's right to appeal in a criminal case.1' Thus, in the area of
From a decision or judgment quashing . .. any indictment . . . or con-
struction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded.
From the... judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defend-
ant has not been put in jeopardy.
6. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
The statute was amended several times, but the amendments did not
render its construction any simpler. The most significant change in the
statute was the 1942 amendment, 56 Stat. 271, . . . provided that some dis-
missals should be reviewed in the courts of appeal ... [I] n 1968, the stat-
ute was further amended to authorize Government appeals from pretrial
rulings granting motions to suppress or to return seized property.
Id. at 337 n.3.
7. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). In Wilson, the Court
sets forth the history and difficulties associated with the various Criminal Appeals
Acts.
8. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970).
9. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in
part: appeal is authorized "from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court
dismissing an indictment or information ... except that no appeal shall lie where
the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution."
10. [1970] U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 5804, 5848-49, which provides "that an
appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judg-
ment..., of a district court dismissing an indictment ... but that no appeal shall
lie in any case in which the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . prohibits further prose-
cution."
11. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). In Wilson the Court notes
that the Conference Committee, which was working on what was to be the Crimi-
nal Appeals Act of 1970, desired to authorize appeals whenever constitutionally
permissible, but it should be the task of the Courts to define the constitutional
boundaries. Thus, the statute does not list specific circumstances that would per-
mit governmental appeal.
See S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1970). The Senate report indicates
that the Judiciary Committee intended to extend the government's right to appeal
in criminal cases to the constitutional limit.
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appeals by the government in criminal cases the question, for the
first time, became one of how the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment should be applied.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY LIMITATIONS
In the 17th century, Lord Coke described the protection af-
forded by the principle of double jeopardy as a function of three
related common-law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and
pardon.12 Blackstone went further in writing that the jeopardy
principle underlying the first two pleas was a, "universal maxim
of the common law of England, . . . no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence."13 In the
United States the case of United States v. Ball,14 addressed the is-
sue of double jeopardy. In Ball, the Court held that a defendant
who is found guilty and then successfully sets aside that verdict,
may be retried without running afoul of the Constitution. How-
ever, the government is bound by a verdict of acquittal and can-
not appeal.15 Thus, determining what constitutes an acquittal
becomes the key to determining when the double jeopardy clause
will bar appeal by the government.
CASE ANALYSIS
The question of when a defendant will be twice placed in jeop-
ardy arises in several procedural situations. To wit: pretrial dis-
missal or acquittal,16 post-trial dismissal or acquittal,'7 mistrial,18
12. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340. See Wurzburg, Double Jeopardy:
Dismissal and Government Appeal, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 337 (1978). The pleas are
prior acquittal and pardon.
13. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340.
14. 163 U.S. 662 (1895).
15. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). In Jorn, the Court espouses
the multiple trial rationale for allowing the double jeopardy clause to bar appeal.
"A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the
same offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protection which
the Constitution establishes .. " Id. at 479.
16. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). Defendant prevailed on a
pretrial motion to dismiss his indictment for willfull failure to report for and sub-
mit to induction into the armed forces. The government sought to appeal one
count and was allowed to do so.
17. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). Defendant won post-
trial motion to dismiss indictment following a guilty verdict entered by the jury for
the charge of converting union funds to defendant's own use in violation of Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976). The
government sought to appeal.
and midtrial dismissal or acquittal.1 9 The major focus of this arti-
cle is on the area of midtrial dismissals or acquittals, for it is this
area that has felt the most turbulence from recent Supreme Court
decisions. 20
Two distinct rationales have been espoused by the Supreme
Court to support the double jeopardy clause limitations on the
government in taking appeal in criminal cases. These separate ra-
tionales have led to the present controversy and confusion in the
case of United States v. Scott.21 Of the nine justices on the Court,
six appear to have taken a definite stand on the question of how
the clause is to be applied. Three justices support the rationale
that the purpose of the double-jeopardy clause is to protect the
defendant from the burden of multiple trials.22 By following this
rationale, the Court is, in fact, saying that the clause protects an
individual by limiting the government to a single criminal pro-
ceeding, recognizing society's understanding of the gross unfair-
ness of requiring the accused to undergo the strain and the agony
of more than one trial for a single offense. 23 Three justices sup-
port the rationale that the purpose of the double-jeopardy clause
is to preserve judgments of culpability.24 Though prevention of
multiple trials is important, it is not controlling. The purpose of
the double jeopardy clause, according to this view, is to protect
final judgments and thus it should not bar retrial where proceed-
ings are terminated on a "basis unrelated to factual guilt or inno-
cence of the offense of which he is accused." 25
18. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Illinois v. Sommerville, 410
U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); standing for the proposition that an appeal of a
mistrial order will only lie where the trial judge bases his order upon a finding of
"manifest necessity." See note 38, infra, and accompanying text.
19. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). Defendant's motion for dismissal
as to two counts of an indictment for illegal distribution of various narcotics was
granted. The government sought to appeal one count.
20. Id. See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 111-14
(1978).
21. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). Scott dealt with the question of the appealability of a
district court order dismissing one count of an indictment before the conclusion of
a trial. The Court set forth two rationales used in deciding when the double jeop-
ardy clause has been violated. The majority opinion supported a trial court deter-
mination of culpability before the issue of double jeopardy will arise. The
minority opinion supports a multiple trial rationale, requiring the appellate court
to consider whether further trial is necessary following appeal, before the issue of
double jeopardy will arise.
22. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
23. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 479 (1971).
24. Chief Justice Burger; Justices Rehnquist and Powell. See The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 57, 109 (1978).
25. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1978). See note 55, infra.
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POST-TRIAL ACQUrITALS OR DIsMIssALs
The Court faced the question of which rationale would control
in United States v. Wilson.26 In Wilson, the jury had entered a
verdict of guilty against the defendant, but the judge dismissed
the indictment for prejudicial pre-indictment delay. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the government's appeal on
the ground that the appeal was barred by the double jeopardy
clause. On rehearing the court of appeals went further, stating
that the district court's ruling was, in fact, an acquittal.27 The
Supreme Court held that the government may appeal in cases
presenting this type of factual situation. The Court reasoned that
the appeal would not result in a new trial or subject the defend-
ant to the harassment of multiple prosecutions because the appel-
late court will either affirm the trial court or find the trial court in
error and reinstate the jury's finding of guilty.28
This same rationale was followed in United States v. Jenkins,29
a case which was heard the same day as Wilson. In Jenkins, the
defendant was charged with failing to submit to induction into the
armed forces of the United States. The case was tried to the court
and following the end of the trial the district court "dismissed"
the indictment.30 The government sought appeal under the Omni-
bus Crime Control Act of 1970.31 The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals dismissed the appeal claiming lack of jurisdiction on the
grounds that the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecu-
tion. The Supreme Court began its review by stating that the fifth
amendment does not distinguish between bench and jury, thus,
the clause applies with equal force to both. However in this case,
the Court noted, Wilson is not controlling. The trial court in Jen-
kins filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but made no de-
termination as to guilt. Thus, though the Court could not say with
certainty whether or not the trial court's ruling was a resolution
of the factual issues against the government, i.e., a finding as to
culpability, the Court could say that further proceedings of some
26. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
27. Id. at 335. The circuit court reasoned that since the district court had re-
lied on facts brought out at trial in reaching its finding of prejudice from the pre-
indictment delay, the circuit court's ruling was, in effect, an acquittal. Thus, the
government could not constitutionally appeal the acquittal.
28. Id. at 352.
29. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
30. Id. at 359.
31. See note 9, supra.
sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the ele-
ments of the offense charged, would be required upon reversal
and remand. Therefore, the Court affirmed the holding of the ap-
pellate court.32 In affirming the Second Circuit Court, the
Supreme Court relied upon the rationale that the individual
should only face the ordeal, expense, anxiety, and insecurity of
trial once, regardless of culpability.33 Based upon Wilson and Jen-
kins, it appears safe to state that in post-trial acquittals the ra-
tionale that the double jeopardy clause was intended to prevent
multiple trial controls. Thus, if an appeal of a post-trial acquittal
will result in further proceedings, the appeal will not be allowed.
MISTRIAL
The question of appeal in mistrial cases presents a unique
problem to the government. This problem results from the rule
that before the double jeopardy clause may bar appeal, jeopardy
must have first attached. "The protections afforded by the clause
are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in
jeopardy."34 Jeopardy attaches only when the defendant has
been "put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be
a jury or a judge." 35 Thus, if the dismissal takes place before
jeopardy attaches, i.e., pretrial, then the order is appealable.3 6
However, some cases have held that an appeal is not allowed
from a pretrial dismissal which resolves facts in favor of the de-
fendant.37
This area is further complicated by the rule that in cases of mis-
trial a finding of "manifest necessity" will bar any double jeop-
32. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
33. Id. at 370. The Court, relying on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957), noted that even if the trial court was to receive no additional evidence, it
would still be necessary for it to make supplemental findings and thus some form
of further proceeding would result from the appeal.
34. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
35. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
36. Serfass V. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). In Serfass, the defendant was
granted a pretrial motion of dismissal, the government sought to appeal, and the
Supreme Court granted the appeal. In granting the appeal the Court noted that
the word acquittal has "no significance in this context unless jeopardy has once
attached and an accused has been subject to the risk of conviction." Id. at 392. See
also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). Order dismissing indictment for
lack of speedy trial directly appealable to Supreme Court. Id. at 311-12.
37. See United States v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1971) (en bane), affg, 454
F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971). In Ponto the trial judge dismissed an indictment for re-
fusal to submit to induction after pretrial hearings. The Seventh Circuit held the
dismissal not to be reviewable, reasoning that the trial court had found the de-
fendant improperly classified and, therefore, acquitted the defendant on the mer-
its. See United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1972). Refusal to hear appeal
on trial court dismissal of indictment for obscenity after pretrial examination.
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ardy claim.3 8 Thus, the cases hold that the accused may be
retried.3 9 This retrial is based upon the concept that a mistrial
ruling invariably rests upon grounds consistent with reprosecu-
tion and that the mistrial order does not contemplate an end to all
prosecution of the defendant for the offense charged.40
The Supreme Court faced the question of "manifest necessity"
in United States v. Jorn.4 1 In Jorn, the defendant was charged
with willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income
tax returns. The judge declared a mistrial upon learning, follow-
ing the impaneling of the jury, that the prosecution was going to
use as witnesses the same taxpayers for whom the defendant al-
legedly prepared returns. The judge, feeling that warnings given
as to the witnesses' constitutional rights were not adequate, dis-
charged the jury and aborted the trial. The case was set for a sec-
ond trial; however, upon a pretrial motion, the information was
dismissed on the grounds of former jeopardy. The government
sought direct appeal to the Supreme Court under the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1970.42 The Supreme Court noted that the
double jeopardy clause will bar retrial of a mistrial case where
"bad-faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor . . . threatens the
[h]arassment [sic] of an accused by successive prosecutions or
declaration of mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict the defendant."43 This was not
the case in Jorn where the trial judge acted upon his own motion.
Thus, the question was one of manifest necessity or abuse of dis-
cretion. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge had abused
his discretion in discharging the jury. The Court relied upon the
rationale that the defendant had an interest in deciding to take
the case from the jury. The defendant did not act here; thus, re-
38. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). The Court required an implicit,
if not explicit, finding of "manifest necessity" to justify the exercise of discretion
by the trial judge in ordering a mistrial. See note 18, supra.
39. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (reprosecution not barred
where jury discharged because juror had served on grand jury indicting defend-
ant); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (reprosecution not barred
where mistrial declared because letter published in newspaper rendered juror's
impartiality doubtful).
40. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 476 (1971).
41. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
42. See note 9, supra.
43. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). See also United States v. Kess-
ler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976), holding that over-reaching by prosecutor allows a
bar to appeal.
prosecution subjected the defendant to personal strain and inse-
curity. Therefore, the Court concluded, any retrial of this case
would violate the double jeopardy clause."
Justice Stewart wrote the dissenting opinion in Jorn, and in it
he supported the rationale that the double jeopardy clause was
intended to protect findings of culpability. "The real question is
whether there has been an 'abuse' of the trial process resulting in
prejudice to the accused. . . such as to outweigh society's inter-
est in the punishment of crime."4s
This dichotomy of rationales reached the Court again in United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Company.46 In Martin, the govern-
ment moved to enforce a consent decree. The case was tried to a
jury which became "hopelessly deadlocked" and the judge dis-
charged it. Pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, the defendant made a timely motion for judgment
of acquittal and the district court granted the motion.47 The gov-
ernment appealed pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1970 and the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit ruling that
the appeal was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment.48 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority relied
upon the rationale that the double jeopardy clause was intended
to prevent multiple trials. The clause, according to this rationale,
was intended to guarantee that "the state shall not be permitted
to make repeated attempts to convict the accused, 'thereby sub-
jecting him to ... expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity ... enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.'"49
The Court went on to conclude that a valid judgment of acquittal
had been entered and that any further appeal would necessitate
another trial or further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
44. 400 U.S. at 486. The Court noted, in support of their finding of abuse of dis-
cretion, that the trial judge had not considered a continuance. Indeed "the trial
judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that, had the prosecution been dis-
posed to suggest a continuance ... there would have been no opportunity to do
so." Id. at 487.
45. Id. at 492.
46. 430 U.S. 564 (1977). In Martin, the company accepted a consent decree fol-
lowing a suit for violation of the Sherman Act, in restraint of trade. The company
was sued again by the government for contempt of the consent decree.
47. FED. R. CRmI. P. 29 provides in part:
(c) Motion After Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty
or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment
of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is dis-
charged. . .. If no verdict is returned, the court may enter judgment of
acquittal ....
48. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Company, 430 U.S. 564, 576
(1977). See also, note 9 supra.
49. Id. at 569.
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resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense. 50
The majority in Martin succeeded in expanding the definition of
acquittal to include acquittals entered pursuant to Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 29(c).
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, argued for the
rationale that the clause applies only to the protection of findings
of culpability. The fact that the order is phrased as an acquittal
rather than a dismissal, should not be dispositive, claimed Chief
Justice Burger.5 1 The key ultimately is whether or not the de-
fendant has been "acquitted." "In ruling on a motion for acquittal
the District Judge must pass on the sufficiency, not on the weight,
of the Government's case." 52 That is, following Martin, the court
should "determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its
label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or
all of the factual elements of the offense charged. '5 3
One distinct problem arose as a result of Martin. Because the
jury reached no guilty verdict in Martin, the Wilson and Jenkins
situation did not arise. Should a Rule 29(c) acquittal follow a jury
verdict of guilty, Wilson and Jenkins would allow appeal of the ac-
quittal because no further proceedings on the merits would be re-
quired if the government were successful on appeal. However,
under Martin, a Rule 29(c) acquittal should be nonappealable. 54
How the Court will resolve this is not yet clear.
MIDTRIAL ACQUITTALS OR DIsMIssALs
In United States v. Scott55 the Court upset a fairly consistent
pattern of dealing with the issue of when a governmental appeal
violates the double jeopardy clause.56 Scott appears to change
the rationale of the double jeopardy clause, in cases of midtrial
50. Id. at 575-76.
51. Id. at 582. Chief Justice Burger also argued that once the jury was dis-
missed, the defendant is no longer in jeopardy in that proceeding, thus the defend-
ant may be reprosecuted without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause. Id.
at 581-582.
52. Id. at 582.
53. Id. at 571.
54. Note, Constitutional Law - Fifth Amendment - Double Jeopardy - The
Double Jeopardy Clause Bars Appellate Review Following A Judgment of Acquit-
tal Entered Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
1055, 1060-61 (1978).
55. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). See also note 21, supra.
56. Until the Scott decision, the Court primarily concentrated on the avoid-
ance of multiple trials in deciding the propriety of government appeals in criminal
dismissals, from that of shielding defendants against the burden
of multiple trials to that of preserving determinations of culpabil-
ity.5 7
Until Scott, the consistent pattern of analysis utilized a three
step determination. The court must determine: (1) has jeopardy
attached; (2) would a government appeal present a threat of suc-
cessive prosecutions; and, (3) is the dismissal, in fact, a mistrial
based upon manifest necessity.58
In Scott, the government's appeal of a district court order dis-
missing two counts of an indictment for federal drug offenses be-
cause of prejudicial pre-indictment delay was dismissed by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit court, relying upon
Jenkins, concluded that further prosecution was barred by the
double jeopardy clause, because "further proceedings of some
sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the ele-
ments of the offense charged, would have been required upon re-
versal and remand."5 9 The Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court
began its analysis by stating that the circuit court's reliance upon
Jenkins, was correct, viewed from past precedents. 60 However
the Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, reasoned that in
the past it had placed "an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the
defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first jury em-
paneled ... where the defendant himself seeks to terminate the
trial before verdict on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or inno-
cence." 61 The Court then overruled Jenkins.62 The majority's
concern with the double jeopardy clause only affecting a judg-
cases. Now the Court's reaction in double jeopardy questions is unpredictable.
See note 80, infra.
57. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 57 (1978). This shift in
focus is illustrated by the difference in treatment given by the majority and the
dissenters in Scott; accord, Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962). In Fong
Foo:
[T]he court held that a defendant could not be retried following an acquit-
tal, even if the acquital were clearly erroneous. Justice Brennan insisted
that Fong Foo . . . went beyond protecting determinations of innocence,
and protected the defendant from the burden of retrial .... However, for
Justice Rehnquist, Fong Foo, reflected the particular significance the law
attaches to acquittal and suggested that the Court prevented appeal after
any acquittal because retrial might increase the odds of convicting an in-
nocent defendant (citations omitted).
See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 H~av. L. REV. 57, 112 n.28 (1978).
58. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977). The Court held that an or-
der of dismissing the information "functionally indistinguishable from a declara-
tion of mistrial." Id. at 31. Thus, the government's appeal was not barred by the
double jeopardy clause.
59. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 86.
60. Id. at 84.
61. Id. at 87.
62. Id. at 86-87.
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ment of acquittal appeared to be the impetus behind the Court's
action in addressing the concern of those who support the multi-
ple trials rationale, the Court stated:
This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a
defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at least in-
sisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact. It is
instead a picture of a defendant who chooses to avoid conviction and im-
prisonment not because . . . the Government has failed to make out a
case against him, but because of a legal claim that the Government's case
against him must fail even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
6 3
The Court then distinguished United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Company,64 by stating that the district court in Martin
had examined the evidence and determined it legally insufficient
to sustain a conviction.65 In Scott, the majority reasoned, the dis-
missal of an indictment for pre-indictment delay represented a le-
gal judgment that the defendant, although criminally culpable,
may not be punished because of a supposed constitutional viola-
tion. The Court was careful to emphasize that its findings were
not based upon waiver, rather, the Court appeared to base its
holding in part on the fact that the defendant deliberately chose
to seek termination of the proceedings on a basis unrelated to fac-
tual guilt or innocence. In so doing, the Court concluded, the
double jeopardy clause does not relieve a defendant from the con-
sequences of his voluntary choice.66 The basic rationale used by
the majority was a concern for findings of culpability. The de-
fendant "has not been deprived of his valued right to go to the
first jury; only the public has been deprived of its valued right to
'one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its
laws.' "67
In his dissent, Justice Brennan objected that under the prior
laws the dismissal would have been treated as an "acquittal" i.e.,
a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial re-
lating to the general issue of the case.68 Even if it does not
amount to an acquittal, claimed Justice Brennan, no appeal by
the government can lie where further proceedings of some sort
devoted to resolution of factual issues are required. Also, if a dis-
63. Id. at 96.
64. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
65. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 97.
66. Id. at 98-99.
67. Id. at 100 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
68. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 102.
missal is premised on the fact that the defendant simply cannot
be convicted of the offense charged, the government cannot ap-
peal.69 The majority attacked both of the latter quasi-acquittals
mentioned above by overruling Jenkins and stating that an appeal
is not barred simply because a dismissal "'is granted on the
ground . . . that the defendant simply cannot be convicted
1"70
The principal difficulty with the Court's holding in Scott is that
in redirecting the focus of the double jeopardy clause the Court
has further confused an already ambiguous area. However, it ap-
pears the holding in Scott is limited to midtrial dismissals. This
follows from the Court's emphasis in Crist v. Bretz,71 also heard
during the 1977 term. The Court in Crist emphasized that the rea-
son double jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn is to protect
the defendant from the burden of multiple trials.72 Thus, the
Court reasserted its support for the multiple trial rationale that
has led to a fairly consistent treatment of cases. Also during the
1977 term, the Court in Arizona v. Washington,73 reasserted that
the restrictions placed upon a trial judge's decision to grant a mis-
trial are designed to protect the defendant from the pains that ac-
company multiple trials.74 ' The Court's previous decision that a
judge's post-verdict dismissal can be appealed - since reversal
would not require additional trials - appears to remain good
law."75 However, the appealability of a Rule 29(c) acquittal by the
district judge following a jury finding of guilty remains an unan-
swered question.
CONCLUSION
A pattern of past decisions in certain types of cases begins to
emerge, though upset by the decisions in Scott, from which some
guidance as to how the Court may rule on future government ap-
peals may be discerned.
(1) A mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant will
be subjected to scrutiny under the "manifest necessity" standard.
Should this standard not be met, the trial court's order of mistrial
69. Id.
70. Id. at 97 (quoting Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977)).
71. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).'
72. Id. at 34-35. In Crist, the Court relied upon Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187.88 (1957). Though Green was decided prior to the Criminal Appeals Act of
1970 (see note 8, supra), the Court in Crist concluded that the rationale of invok-
ing the double jeopardy clause to prevent multiple trials, which was used in
Green, was applicable to criminal cases following the 1970 Act.
73. 434 U.S. 497 (1978). See note 9, supra.
74. Id. at 508-11.
75. 92 HARv. L. REV. 57, 113 (1978).
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is improper and the defendant may not be retried.76
(2) The government may appeal a pretrial order dismissing
the indictment and discharging the defendant. A dismissal en-
tered at this stage is not a ruling on the merits and jeopardy has
not attached.77
(3) The government may appeal post-verdict ruling by the
trial court if entered after a general finding of guilt by the fact
finder.78
(4) The double jeopardy clause protects the defendant only in
cases of determinations of innocence in midtrial dismissals. 79
In cases of midtrial dismissals, the rule set forth in Scott may
ultimately lead to more confusion than clarity. Following Scott, a
dismissal on the grounds of pre-indictment delay, which is not an
adjudication of innocence, appears to be appealable. However, a
dismissal based upon the defense of entrapment or insanity con-
stitutes an acquittal which is nonappealable. The majority's ex-
planation that these defenses are based upon "factual judgments"
whereas dismissals of indictment for pre-indictment delay are "le-
gal judgments" is hard to follow. All defenses, after all, require
the application of legal principles to facts adduced at trial. It is
difficult to tell how the Court will deal with this distinction in the
future. The government must, therefore, place particular empha-
sis on the argument that there has been no adjudication of inno-
cence in cases involving affirmative defenses.
There is also the question of whether or not Scott would apply
to cases where the defendant did not request the dismissal. The
Court in Scott, did not appear to rely entirely upon the fact that
the defendant made the request in reaching its decision. How-
ever, the Court did state that when the defendant asks for a dis-
missal "[nJo interest protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause is
invaded" by a possible retrial.80
In other areas of dismissals, unlike midtrial, the Court's consis-
tent emphasis on avoidance of multiple trials, through the use of
the double jeopardy clause, has resulted in a fairly consistent pat-
76. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); United States v. Perez, 23 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
77. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
78. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
79. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
80. Id. at 100.
tern.8 1 However, by redirecting the purpose of the double jeop-
ardy clause to protect only findings of culpability in the area of
mistrial dismissals, the Court has caused unnecessary uncer-
tainty. How the Scott decision will affect other procedural areas
such as post-trial dismissals or pre-trial dismissals has yet to be
shown. Thus, it would behoove attorneys who are faced with a
possible appeal by the government in criminal cases to keep in
mind the apparent shift in rationale by the Court as is shown by
the Scott decision.
In the end, perhaps the only guidance that is available following
the Scott decision is that "the double jeopardy clause protects the
defendant against the burden of multiple trials, except in the case
of midtrial dismissals when the clause only protects determina-
tions of innocence, at least when the defendant requests dismis-
sal."82
CURTIS L. MUNCY
81. This pattern reveals a consistent concern for the avoidance of possible
multiple trials by use of the double jeopardy clause in the following cases: Ari-
zona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377
(1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 357 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332 (1975); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). See also note 56, supra.
82. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 113-14 (1978); George,
United States Supreme Court, B.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 531-32 (1978).
